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Abstrak 
Poros Maritim Dunia menjadi landasan penting politik luar negeri dan dalam negeri Indonesia pada masa kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo. 
Indonesia dibayangkan sebagai kekuatan maritim regional yang mampu menjaga keamanan di wilayah maritimnya sendiri dan wilayah Indo-
Pasifik. Ini menunjukkan ambisi Indonesia yang menginginkan peningkatan ekonomi dari sektor maritim. Poros Maritim Dunia bentukan  Presiden 
Joko Widodo  telah berjalan selama tiga tahun. Meskipun dapat dilihat pembangunan secara fisik yang luar biasa, akan tetapi pembangunan 
kesadaran maritim atau MDA masih kurang diperhatikan. Sebagai dasar dari kebijakan maritim, menjadi penting bagi Indonesia untuk 
memastikan kapasitas pembangunan MDA yang memadai guna memberikan arah pemangku kepentingan dalam mengalokasikan dan 
memprioritaskan sumber daya. Tulisan ini membangun sebuah kerangka MDA untuk mengevaluasi pembangunan MDA Indonesia di tiga level: 
strategis, operasional, dan teknis. Kerangka ini mengidentifikasi tiga permasalahan, antara lain kurangnya kapasitas untuk mengadakan 
operasional MDA yang berkelanjutan, kurangnya koordinasi antar agensi, serta permasalahan pemahaman mengenai kemaritiman. Pada 
bagian akhir, tulisan ini memberikan beberapa rekomendasi yang bertujuan meningkatkan kapasitas Indonesia untuk membangun MDA. 
Kata kunci: Kewaspadaan Lingkungan Maritim, Poros Maritim Dunia, kebijakan maritim Indonesia, keamanan maritim, pembangunan angkatan 
laut. 
 
Abstract 
The Global Maritime Fulcrum has been an essential cornerstone of Indonesian foreign and domestic policy for the Joko Widodo 
administration. It envisions Indonesia as a regional maritime power capable of providing maritime security within its territorial waters and 
the Indo-Pacific region. It also captures Indonesia’s ambition to boost its maritime economy. The Joko Widodo administration has been 
building the Global Maritime Fulcrum for three years. Though physical development has indeed been remarkable, there has been a lack of 
a focus on developing maritime domain awareness or MDA. As an essential foundation of maritime policy, it is important that a state 
invests in ensuring adequate MDA-building capacities to guide its maritime policy. Without proper MDA, it would be difficult for maritime 
stakeholders to allocate and prioritise maritime resources to the key areas of concern of the Global Maritime Fulcrum. This paper 
constructs a framework of MDA, which is used to examine the issues with Indonesia’s MDA-building process at three levels: strategic, 
operational, and technical. It identifies three issues, namely a lack of capacity to conduct sustained MDA operations, a lack of inter-agency 
coordination, and the problem of maritime ‘sense-making.’ Several policy recommendations aimed at increasing Indonesia’s capacity to 
build MDA are proposed at the end. 
Key Words: maritime domain awareness, Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia maritime policy, maritime security, naval development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION
Since 2014, President Joko Widodo proposed 
Indonesia as being a centre of maritime and economic 
activity in the Indo-Pacific due to its lucrative 
geostrategic position in global maritime trade. At the 
9th East Asia Summit, Joko Widodo iterated the five 
pillars of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), which 
includes maritime culture, economy, infrastructure, 
diplomacy, and defence. In the 2017 Indonesian Ocean 
Policy document, the initial five pillars have been 
reiterated and expanded to include (1) marine and 
human resources development, (2) maritime security, 
law enforcement, and safety at sea, (3) ocean 
governance and institutions, (4) maritime economy 
development, (5) sea space management and marine 
protection, (6) maritime culture, and (7) maritime 
diplomacy. An additional six principles on which the 
Ocean Policy will be carried out on, which includes 
(1) Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook), (2) 
sustainable development, (3) blue economy, (4) 
integrated and transparent management, (5) 
participation, and (6) equality and equitability 
(Indonesian Ocean Policy (Presidential Decree of the 
Republic of Indonesia no. 16/2017), 2017). 
The overall goals of the GMF are strategic and 
economic in nature (Agastia and Perwita, 2015). 
Jokowi’s GMF envisions the Indonesian Navy (TNI-
AL) as being a regional green-water navy capable of 
handling security threats within and beyond 
Indonesian territorial waters. Upholding maritime 
security is an essential prerequisite for the fulfilment 
of the latter pillars, which are largely economic. The 
economic goals work at both the domestic and 
international level. These ambitions are reflected in 
Joko Widodo’s ambitions in creating a ‘sea highway’ 
(tol laut), which comprises of large vessels capable of 
transporting large amounts of cargo and people. The 
end goal at the domestic level is to accelerate and 
ensure equal economic development across the 
archipelago by increasing inter-island connectivity. At 
the regional level, accelerating development of 
domestic maritime infrastructure is expected to better 
link Indonesian ports and harbours with international 
maritime trade routes and sea lanes of 
communication (SLOCs), particularly those spanning 
the Indo-Pacific. 
Seeing these ambitions, there is an urgency for 
Indonesia to improve its maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) capabilities. For the purposes of this paper, 
the concept of MDA generally refers to having a 
comprehensive understanding of the maritime 
environment, which encompasses the 
physical/material and immaterial aspects such as (but 
not limited to) maritime traffic, geography, legal 
jurisdictions, and extent of maritime territory. From 
that understanding, maritime stakeholders allow the 
formulation of tactical/technical, operational, and 
strategic decisions as a means to further the national 
interest. Without proper MDA, it would be difficult 
for stakeholders to prioritise and allocate maritime 
resources to the key areas of concern of the GMF. As 
an illustration, constructing a sustainable maritime 
economy through fisheries would be difficult if those 
fisheries are not monitored adequately. The 
stakeholders would need to be able to monitor for 
potential violations – e.g. illegal fishing, use of 
prohibited fishing methods, etc. – and ensure 
adequate enforcement. These activities require 
extensive MDA capabilities which Indonesia 
continues to lack.  
Marsetio has emphasised the importance of 
developing Indonesia’s MDA capabilities due to 
Indonesia’s geopolitical position (Marsetio, 2014, pp. 
55-57). Indonesia is situated between the Indian and 
Pacific Ocean which hosts some of the world’s most 
important maritime trade routes. Some areas of 
interest in Indonesia’s vicinity include the Malacca 
Strait, a crowded and narrow maritime sea lane of 
communication that is prone to piracy and armed 
robbery; the contested South China Sea, which over 
the years has seen simmering tensions between China 
and claimant states; and the Sulu Sea, which has 
recently seen an increase in piracy incidents 
(Connelly, 2015; E. A. Laksmana, 2011). 
Better MDA capabilities would allow Indonesia 
to formulate better maritime policy. Official 
documents tend to emphasise the end objectives of 
the GMF instead of the means for achieving the 
GMF. In the 2015 Defence White Paper, there are 
expectations to build a maritime surveillance system 
using ‘satellites and drones’; however, further 
 
 
elaboration on the specific details of implementation 
remain unclear (Defence Ministry of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2015). The 2017 Indonesian Ocean Policy 
document also fails to elaborate the implementation 
of a possible maritime surveillance network that is 
necessary for building MDA capabilities. There is little 
mention of how the government intends on funding 
such a network, yet it emphasises the importance of 
being aware of the maritime domain. Furthermore, 
the document tells little of how Indonesia is expected 
to direct the thirteen agencies share varying degrees of 
authority in maritime security governance (Salim, 
2015). While there seems to be consensus that 
Indonesia needs to increase its MDA capabilities as a 
requisite for fulfilling its maritime ambitions, a 
comprehensive framework or roadmap that combines 
analyses at the strategic, operational, and technical 
levels of MDA remains to be seen. 
 Thus, this paper argues that Indonesia’s naval 
development requires a comprehensive understanding 
of MDA to achieve its fullest potential. While physical 
development is indeed necessary for Indonesia to 
become a regional maritime power, MDA – which is a 
fundamental strategic concept in maritime 
development – also need to be developed. The 
importance of developing MDA lies in its guiding and 
directive power over physical maritime assets. Without 
building proper MDA, maritime development risks 
progressing based on political whims rather than 
proper understanding of the maritime domain. In this 
paper, we propose a framework of building MDA. It 
seeks to illustrate the actors and objects in the MDA-
building process at the technical, operational, and 
strategic level. Using the framework, it is then possible 
to (1) identify the limitations in the MDA-building 
process in Indonesia, and (2) provide 
recommendations to address these limitations in the 
MDA-building process. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
UNDERSTANDING MDA AS A CONCEPT 
As with the term ‘maritime security’, maritime 
domain awareness continues to spark debate over its 
exact definition (Bueger, 2015b). The differences in 
defining MDA usually stem from the context of its 
usage. Generally, there are three levels at which MDA 
is understood. In the technical domain, MDA 
originates from the practice of identifying and 
targeting the naval opposition. ‘Awareness’ is often 
limited to a vessel’s immediate surroundings or 
‘maritime situational awareness’ (Watts, 2006). 
Moving up to the operational level, MDA includes 
‘sufficient capacity for sufficient surveillance and 
awareness across particular sea areas.’ At the higher 
strategic level, MDA can be generally understood as 
the capacity for policy-makers to understand the 
maritime environment and its traditional and non-
traditional security dynamics which may affect the 
state either directly or indirectly. As stated in the 
National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD-41), 
MDA is ‘…the effective understanding of anything 
associated with the global Maritime Domain that 
could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of the United States.’ (National Security 
Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-13, December 2004) 
Based on these interpretations, MDA is 
essentially an enabler for the formulation and 
implementation of maritime policy. Having MDA 
means having the capability to understand the 
geostrategic benefits of the sea for the benefit of the 
state. This includes awareness and understanding of 
the utilisation of strategic maritime resources, such as 
(but not limited to) fisheries, domestic and regional 
maritime trade routes, and offshore energy resources. 
This knowledge will be the basis of maritime policy. In 
implementing maritime policy, MDA requires the 
capacity to exploit the sea for maximum utility. This 
means that maritime agencies ought to be capable of 
building awareness through information gathering 
and surveillance and then acting upon that 
intelligence. They are also required to be able to share 
that intelligence with fellow agencies (horizontal 
sharing) and with policymaking agencies (vertical 
sharing) to ensure an appropriate response can be 
formulated. This is especially important in states 
where there are many maritime security agencies 
operate simultaneously, such as Indonesia. Equipped 
with intelligence gained at the operational and 
technical levels, policymakers will be able to know 
how to use the sea and how to direct and guide the 
physical element – i.e. naval forces and their 
 
 
auxiliaries – to achieve maximum utility of the sea in 
both domestic and foreign policy. 
Possessing sufficient MDA entails three 
important benefits. Firstly, policymakers will be able 
to allocate appropriate maritime resources to key areas 
of maritime security. If intelligence at the operational 
and technical levels suggests a spike in pirate activities 
in a vital area, swift policy changes ought to be made 
as a response. The implementation of such decision 
may take form in the mobilisation of more naval or 
coast guard vessels, increased surveillance, or 
requesting assistance to an existing multilateral 
network. Second, sufficient MDA also means that 
policymakers know the limits of their naval 
capabilities, thus allowing them to not implement 
policies that are beyond their reach. It also allows 
policymakers to prioritise. If intelligence at the lower 
levels suggest a shortage in naval vessels and 
surveillance capabilities at the border areas, 
policymakers would then should not embark on 
policies that could leave maritime security 
compromised and instead consider options of fleet 
modernisation. Third, the policymakers will be able to 
understand trends and patterns in the maritime 
domain and adjust their policies to anticipate future 
trends to the best of their capacity. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR MDA 
In this section, we propose a comprehensive 
framework that shows how MDA can enable the 
formulation and implementation of a state’s maritime 
policy. Some terms used in the framework ought to be 
elaborated. The ‘maritime domain’ is understood as a 
three-dimensional maritime space, including the ‘areas 
and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable 
waterway’ along with its both material and immaterial 
features. Material features include, but are not limited 
to, features of maritime topography (particularly 
undersea and sea-level features), the presence of 
maritime vessels or infrastructure (offshore platforms, 
ports, harbours, etc.), and movement of maritime 
vessels within the maritime domain. This has been 
illustrated aptly in Boraz’s interpretation of MDA as, 
…finding the ships and submarines of friends and 
foes, understanding the entire supply chain of 
cargoes, identifying people aboard vessels, 
understanding the infrastructures within or 
astride the maritime domain, and identifying 
anomalies and potential threats in all these areas 
(Boraz, 2009, p. 141).  
Yet, Boraz’s definition remains incomplete as it 
does not fully regard the political aspect of the 
maritime domain. The states need to increasingly take 
heed of existing political and/or legal instruments 
which could be used to legitimise their utilisation of 
the maritime domain. Such instruments include the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, COLREGS, 
the ISPS Code, or the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. As such, this framework adds an 
immaterial layer to the maritime domain which 
includes the political-legal aspects that permeates the 
maritime domain which influences the way a state 
may decide to adjust their maritime strategy. These 
may include (but not limited to) acknowledgement 
and implementation (or lack thereof) of the 
international law of the sea within a particular 
maritime domain, a state’s maritime boundaries and 
probable contestations, and the imposition of 
restricted zones in a specific maritime domain. By 
incorporating both material and immaterial factors of 
the maritime domain, a clearer and more 
comprehensive ‘maritime image’ can be constructed, 
resulting in better MDA (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The Maritime Domain Awareness Building Loop 
 
 
At the lowest technical level, the MDA-building 
process is concerned mostly with maritime situational 
awareness, or gathering information on the material 
elements of the maritime domain. Should the need 
 
 
arise, the agency in question may act to counter the 
identified threat. The MDA process at this level is 
simply being aware of one’s maritime surroundings 
and acting based on that awareness. This level is 
mostly limited to the individual agency, such as the 
naval patrol vessel out at sea or coastal surveillance 
stations.  
Moving up to the operational level or the 
middle rung of the ladder, the process of MDA-
building becomes significantly more complex. The 
functions carried out at this level, in some ways, are 
similar to the technical level with an added layer of 
coordination and processing. Agencies at the 
operational level (henceforth, operational agencies) 
are concerned not only with the identification of 
threats, but also prioritisation (‘Does this threat 
matter?’) and information gathering. To do this, 
operational agencies have to consult the priorities set 
at the strategic level, until then deciding whether to 
act upon that threat through the available means. At 
this level, operational agencies need to be capable of 
understanding the extent of which the material and 
immaterial elements of the maritime domain may 
influence a particular decision.  
One important task in MDA-building process 
at the operational level is the processing and 
compiling of information. As ships (both naval and 
civilian) at sea travel, operational agencies monitor 
their routes and receive reports and updates as they 
travel along their respective routes. At this level, the 
broad term ‘information’ becomes significant. 
‘Information’ can be differentiated into three broad 
types: incidents, movements, and sensitive data such 
as naval intelligence or criminal investigations 
(Bueger, 2015a). Incidents at sea encompasses many 
instances, such as actual or attempted piracy, ship 
collisions, and transnational crimes. Information on 
movements allow the state to monitor its waterways 
and measure the volume of traffic. Sensitive data may 
be used to further pinpoint potential maritime 
threats. Combined together, this allows the 
operational agencies to construct a rudimentary 
‘maritime image’ that incorporates trends and 
patterns drawn from information on movements and 
incidents of maritime vessels within the specified 
maritime domain. One example includes results from 
MDA information-sharing centres such as the 
ReCAAP ISP Annual Report, which reports on piracy 
incidents in Southeast Asia.  
However, this ‘maritime image’ is not enough. 
Amidst the cacophony of incident reports, 
movements, and sensitive information, operational 
agencies also need to fulfil a coordination and 
aggregation role. The collection of information on the 
maritime domain can hardly be conducted by a single 
agency; instead, many agencies – both military and 
civilian, government and non-government, national 
and international – are involved.  The operational 
agencies are the ones who will coordinate these 
agencies so information-gathering activities at the 
technical level are directed towards a predefined 
agenda set at the strategic level. Sifting through these 
often complex networks and piecing together 
meaningful information into a coherent ‘maritime 
image’ is perhaps the most important task conducted 
at the operational level. 
The ‘maritime image’ constructed at the 
operational level can further be refined and utilised at 
the strategic level. Policymaking requires the 
knowledge of the maritime domain gathered at the 
operational level, added with strategic analyses. Three 
core aspects of strategic MDA require understanding 
and knowledge of (1) the state’s own maritime 
capabilities, (2) the strategic utility of the maritime 
domain, and (3) the trends and patterns occurring in 
the maritime domain.  Based on this knowledge, the 
strategic level then outlines the priorities for the 
state’s maritime strategy. For example, if the trends 
show an increase in activities related to piracy that 
have a direct impact on a state’s maritime trade, at the 
strategic level, piracy ought to be prioritised in 
maritime strategy. In informing maritime policy, 
policymakers ought to engage routinely with informed 
advisers (Till, 2015). The task of establishing maritime 
governance is yet another important task at the 
strategic level. This includes creating a structure that 
ensures coordination and cooperation among the 
many agencies involved in building MDA, such as the 
navy, coast guard, and other civilian institutions. The 
end goal is to ensure that the MDA-building process 
operates smoothly without any hindrances at any 
levels.  
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Once maritime strategy has been formulated, it 
is then implemented into the maritime domain. The 
state then continues its usual MDA-building loop, by 
which it also evaluates the changes in the maritime 
domain caused by the implementation of the 
maritime strategy. This feedback is collected either at 
the operational or technical level and then assessed at 
the strategic level. Thus, the state continues to adjust 
its maritime strategy according to its knowledge of the 
maritime domain. 
Limitations to Build MDA in Indonesia 
Three problems have been highlighted, namely 
(1) the lack of capacity to gather and process 
information, (2) lack of inter-agency cooperation and 
coordination, and (3) lack of ‘sense-making’ resources.   
Lack of Capacity to Gather and Process 
Information 
At the operational and technical levels, creating 
the ‘maritime image’ requires equipment such as naval 
vessels, imaging technology, and information-sharing 
technology. There are thirteen agencies that are 
involved in safeguarding Indonesian waters and 
enforcing maritime security. However, these agencies 
often have to compete with one another for funding 
and resources. Some major agencies include the Navy, 
Marine Police (Polair), and Customs (Meliala, 
Ariando, Kusumo, Hartati, & Fatoni, 2016). The 
recently-established Maritime Security Agency 
(Bakamla) is also promising, however, it still suffers 
from a lack of equipment and manpower, for which it 
still needs to be dependent on the Navy (CNN 
Indonesia, 31 August 2016).  
The Navy remains the most important actor in 
the MDA-building process, especially at the 
operational and technical level. Although the Navy is 
the most resourceful agency out of the thirteen 
maritime agencies, it still suffers from a lack of 
equipment. One of the primary tools in building 
MDA is naval vessels, as they can serve multiple roles. 
In building MDA, naval vessels serve the dual-role of 
defence and intelligence gathering. Currently, the 
Navy is struggling with both these roles. According to 
Minimum Essential Force (MEF) projections, the 
Navy requires at least 154 vessels to maintain 
maritime security by 2024, with an optimal scenario 
of 274 vessels (Koh, 2015). To achieve MEF goals, 
Indonesia has been actively acquiring new naval 
vessels to replace its ageing fleet (Bakrie, 2009). In 
2011, Indonesia signed a deal to purchase three Type-
209 Chang Bogo diesel submarines from South 
Korean shipbuilding company, DSME (Afrida, 10 
November 2016). In 2014, PT PAL and Damen 
Scheide Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) agreed to jointly 
produce two Sigma guided-missile corvettes. The first 
vessel, the KRI Radden Eddy Martadinata, has 
completed sea trials in 2016 and has been handed 
over to the Navy in January 2017, while the second is 
expected to be handed over by the end of 2017 
(ANTARA, 7 April 2017). The BAKAMLA has also 
placed an order for a 110m offshore patrol vessel 
(OPV), which is expected to bolster its capabilities as a 
Coast Guard (Rahmat, December 2016). 
Building MDA also requires sophisticated 
imaging and sensors technology. In the 2015 Defence 
White Book, Indonesia has outlined a vision of 
establishing an archipelago-wide maritime surveillance 
system using drones and satellites to support the 
Global Maritime Fulcrum, however, the current 
surveillance system relies mostly on radar (Defence 
Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015, p. 2). 
Although efforts to create an Integrated Maritime 
Surveillance System (IMSS) have begun since 2008 
with aid from the United States, the program has met 
some hurdles, particularly in the maintenance and 
operation of the equipment. The jointly-established 
IMSS covers the Malacca Strait, Makassar Strait, and 
the Moluccas Strait and comprises of 18 coastal 
surveillance stations (CSS), 11 ship-based radars, 2 
regional command centres, and 2 fleet command 
centres (Febrica, 2017, pp. 105-106). As the producer 
of the equipment, the U.S. enacted a restriction on 
maintenance. Repairs on IMSS equipment could only 
be carried out under the permission of the United 
States. During a working visit to Riau in 2011, the 
radar at the Dumai naval base in Riau – part of the 18 
IMSS coastal surveillance stations – was found to be 
damaged. The Navy could not repair them 
independently due to US restrictions, yet they could 
not afford to send the radar in for repairs. The First 
 
 
Commission recommended the naval base to 
independently carry out repairs as the radar was a vital 
piece of equipment (Parliament of Indonesia, 2011b).  
In another Working Visit in 2011 to Central 
Sulawesi, the Commission I found that the radar 
installed at the Palu naval base could only operate for 
two-thirds of a day and is heavily dependent on power 
supply from the state-owned power company. The 
Commission I also found that the base was 
undermanned, further limiting the capabilities of a 
naval base responsible for monitoring Archipelagic 
Sea Lanes II and III. (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia; 
ALKI) (Parliament of Indonesia, 2011a).1 In a 2010 
visit to Tanjung Pinang naval base, located near the 
Malacca Strait, Commission I found that the base 
only possessed one radar which operated 24 hours 
non-stop and was supplied by electricity from a 
generator. These conditions caused the radar to not 
operate at maximum efficiency. Commission I thus 
recommended to acquire more radar units and 
connect the existing radar to the national energy grid 
(Parliament of Indonesia, 2010). 
The Navy also continues to struggle with 
logistical issues. Working Visit Reports by 
Commission I of the Parliament indicate the Navy has 
been struggling with limited fuel and energy supplies 
to sustain naval operations and a lack of manpower 
and vessels for various duties, including operating 
surveillance equipment and sea patrols. Soldier 
welfare was also found to be substandard, with reports 
of delayed remuneration and unsatisfactory living 
conditions within the base. In a 2009 Working Visit 
to Riau, Commission I found that the Tanjung 
Pinang Main Naval Base often faced fuel shortages, 
which negatively affects the Navy’s operational 
readiness (Parliament of Indonesia, 2009). The 
subsequent Specific Visit Report in 2010 provides the 
following details regarding the state of the Marines’ 
living standards on Nipah Island, one of the 
outermost islands in Indonesia’s territory near 
Singapore: 
The barracks have been repaired, but the repairs 
are unsatisfactory. The walls are constructed from 
plywood or asbestos, and thus, the barracks could 
not be used as protective cover should an attack 
occur. The inside of the barracks was also very hot 
due to the low ceiling and lack of air 
conditioning. There are no sources of clean 
drinking water. The soldiers drink distilled 
seawater, but according to lab results, the water 
does not meet healthy drinking water standards. 
Regular shipments of drinking water are dropped 
off from neighbouring areas using the Navy’s 
vessels or traditional vessels. […] Communications 
equipment are lacking and are heavily affected by 
bad weather. […] The SS1 rifles are in poor 
condition. Soldiers also do not possess means of 
transportation. The three motor boats are 
damaged and cannot be used. […] Daily meal 
allowances are considered inadequate, with each 
soldier only provided Rp 25,000 daily (around 
US$ 2). […] There are also no healthcare facilities. 
If a soldier falls ill, they have to wait for 
transportation to Batam either via Navy transport 
or fishing boat (Parliament of Indonesia, 2010, 
pp. 9-11). 
Equipment and logistical issues mean that at 
the technical level, the MDA-building process occurs 
slowly and inadequately. Without quick and proper 
situational awareness, the Navy becomes severely 
limited in their capability to address potential 
maritime security threats. At the higher levels, this 
delays the formation of a coherent ‘maritime image’ 
which has further impacts on policy. It then becomes 
even more difficult to envision an integrated maritime 
surveillance system using drones and satellites. 
Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation and 
Coordination 
Building MDA ought to be a cooperative 
venture that involves many agencies within the 
government, smooth communication is essential so 
the many agencies can carry out their duties in a 
coordinated manner. A lack of coordination and 
cooperation may result in the production of a 
distorted ‘maritime image’, which has ramifications in 
the making of maritime policy. At the higher strategic 
level, the conflicting interests occurring at the 
operational-technical levels may potentially 
undermine efforts to build a coherent ‘maritime 
image’.  
There are several major actors that are heavily 
involved in the MDA-building process, namely the 
Navy as part of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (MOFMA), 
and the Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan 
 
 
Laut; BAKAMLA). Among these agencies, the 
Bakamla was formed to improve information-sharing 
between maritime stakeholders, along with the added 
authority to deploy maritime resources in line with its 
threefold mission of realizing national and 
international maritime security, safeguarding 
Indonesia’s sovereignty, and strengthening Indonesia’s 
maritime capabilities. Along with added authority, the 
Bakamla has also been equipped with additional 
personnel and vessels.2 
Joko Widodo’s intent was to transform the 
Bakamla into the equivalent of an Indonesian Coast 
Guard, capable of coordinating the twelve maritime 
security agencies. However, the agency has so far been 
powerless in breaking down institutional silos, which 
have persisted since the New Order and are 
exacerbated by internal competition and legal turf 
wars (Supriyanto and Rusdi, 2 January 2013). Friction 
tends to occur between the Navy, Customs, and Police 
due to the overlapping investigative authorities 
bestowed upon the agencies based on existing 
regulations. Each agency may claim jurisdiction over 
maritime law enforcement duties, which leads to less 
cooperation and a tendency to be involved in legal 
‘turf wars. A potential clash of authority may occur 
between the Bakamla, Navy, and Marine Police. Law 
no. 34/2000 provides the Navy with the authority to 
conduct maritime law enforcement operations within 
Indonesia’s territorial waters and EEZ. The same 
authority is also provided to Bakamla, in coordination 
with the Marine Police, under Presidential Regulation 
no. 178/2014 and Law no. 32/2014. Coincidentally, 
Law no. 32/2014 provides similar authority for the 
Ministry of Transportation’s Sea and Coastal Unit 
(Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai; KPLP), the Ministry 
of Fisheries’ Civil Service Investigations Unit, and the 
Customs (Agastia, 2017). At the operational level, 
whose authority ought to supersede the other in the 
rare case these agencies meet simultaneously? 
Ideally, there ought to be a single maritime 
security agency that can coordinate maritime security 
activities. At the moment, the Bakamla is being fitted 
to fulfil this role. A single coordinating agency would 
serve to eliminate institutional silos and redundancies, 
thus potentially reducing turf wars. The elimination of 
silos would greatly increase the effectiveness of 
building MDA, as information gathering and sharing 
would be conducted under one umbrella. There 
would, however, be costs to bear before seeing the 
Bakamla as the single coordinator of Indonesia’s 
maritime security. Setting up such a mechanism 
would require rigorous institutional and legal 
overhaul. Existing legislation would need to be 
reviewed and revised to accommodate the Bakamla’s 
new role, which means downsizing the less essential 
agencies (e.g. the Civil Service Investigations Unit of 
the respective Ministries) and integrating them into 
the Bakamla’s structure. Institutional integration 
would also need to take into account the Ministry of 
Defence It would take tremendous effort to bring 
together these agencies, and even more so to bridge 
existing differences.3   
Seeing Through the Glass Darkly 
The issue at the strategic level is that 
policymakers tend to ‘see through a glass darkly.’ (Till, 
2013, p. 338) It is difficult to predict future trends in 
an increasingly complex maritime domain, especially 
when the dynamics are ever-changing. Though there 
may be adequate information gathering measures at 
the operational and technical level, the information 
needs to be refined and analysed so that it can be 
turned into actionable intelligence that has direct 
influence on national maritime policy. In other words, 
at the strategic level, much of MDA activities centre 
on ‘sense-making’, or refining the ‘maritime image’. 
This includes mapping out trends and patterns and 
then using these trends and patterns as a basis for 
analysing existing maritime policies.  
At the strategic level, the Indonesian Ocean Policy 
document serves as an umbrella document for the 
formulation of the GMF, but not the implementation. 
It has provided a definitive interpretation of the GMF 
which envisions Indonesia as ‘a sovereign, advanced, 
independent, strong maritime nation that is able to 
provide positive contribution for peace and security of 
the region and the world in accordance with its 
national interest.’ (Indonesian Ocean Policy (Presidential 
Decree of the Republic of Indonesia no. 16/2017), 2017, 
p. Introduction) Though the document may provide a 
shared interpretation of the goals of the GMF, along 
with the key areas of interests related directly to the 
 
 
GMF, the document itself cannot be seen as a 
document that can unite existing programs under 
different ministries. It ‘codifies and fleshes out the 
skeleton of the GMF’, but does little in other areas (E. 
Laksmana, 23 March 2017). Firstly, it lacks a 
provision for the establishment of a central agency 
that has the power to control and coordinate the 
many maritime programs under the existing 
ministries. Secondly, the document provides little 
explanation as to how domestic programs will be 
linked to regional maritime security programs. In the 
case of MDA, not only is there little mention of the 
need for of domestic MDA capabilities, but also how 
Indonesian maritime security agencies can use existing 
multilateral MDA centres to achieve the objectives of 
the GMF. 
Who would be able to shoulder the duty of 
‘sense-making’? Till proposes the formulation of 
maritime policy be aided by an ‘informed 
commentariat’. The commentariat would consist of 
independent elements, ideally from 
academia/universities or civilian think-tanks. The 
scope of the commentariat in Indonesia, however, 
remains small (Till, 2015). Furthermore, interaction 
between maritime security stakeholders and the 
informed commentariat has been limited at best.  
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the course of Indonesia’s project 
to achieve the Global Maritime Fulcrum, it has 
overlooked maritime domain awareness as a crucial 
enabler despite having made significant progress in 
physical naval development. We have elaborated the 
myriad problems that Indonesia has in building its 
maritime domain awareness capabilities. These 
problems are apparent at all levels – strategic, 
operational, and technical – and in many maritime 
security stakeholders, which include limited 
operational-technical capabilities due to lack of 
relevant equipment, incoordination between the 
prominent maritime security agencies, and a limited 
understanding of MDA at the strategic level. To 
address these issues, we propose several policy 
recommendations. 
A major hurdle in establishing a common 
maritime image is a lack of coordination between the 
many maritime stakeholders in Indonesia. A ‘hub-and-
spoke’ architecture would be an ideal structure for 
organising Indonesia’s scattered maritime security 
actors (Bueger, 2015a). The Bakamla has the largest 
potential to become a hub for MDA in Indonesia in 
coordination with the Coordinating Ministry for 
Maritime Affairs. As a hub, the Bakamla would act as 
a facilitator for cross-agency capacity building. It 
would be where the academic expertise should be 
collated. Supervising the work of the Bakamla would 
come under the duties of the Coordinating Ministry 
for Maritime Affairs. The foundations of such a 
system would be a robust intelligence-sharing network 
between the actors. 
The creation of indigenous information fusion 
centres, with functions mirroring the IFC and 
ReCAAP ISC, may be a possible option for increasing 
Indonesia’s MDA capabilities. These agencies should 
ideally be independent, staffed with competent 
people, and have adequate links to other such centres 
in the region. In the Indonesian context, these centres 
ought to be government-run MDA centres run under 
a civilian-military partnership scheme. However, due 
to the sheer extent of Indonesia’s maritime domain, 
coupled with the many international interests present 
in Indonesia’s surrounding waters, it becomes 
important for Indonesia to look towards regional 
neighbours for their support through bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives. Existing initiatives tend to 
focus much on Indonesia’s western waters, through 
schemes such as the Indonesia-Singapore SURPIC II, 
the ReCAAP ISC (to which Indonesia has yet to 
become a member), and the Eyes-in-the-Sky trilateral 
surveillance initiative (Supriyanto, 2017). In the 
eastern waters, Indonesia and Australia would benefit 
from the formation of a joint MDA centre. It would 
be best to make use of existing multilateral MDA 
centres that exist in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has yet 
to become a member of ReCAAP. By delaying 
membership, Indonesia only stands to lose more in 
the long run. Though Marsetio wrote of it being a 
shame that external agencies know more of 
Indonesian waters than Indonesia itself, Indonesia 
may be able to acquire knowledge and expertise to 
build its own domestic MDA centres (Marsetio, 2014, 
pp. 58-59). Furthermore, by joining regional MDA 
 
 
centres, Indonesia can also gain access to their 
facilities and foster regional cooperation in maritime 
security. 
Considering the proximity of the regions in 
Southeast Asia, maritime security should be a regional 
concern with ASEAN members sharing the burden 
proportionately according to their respective 
capabilities. However, there are several issues that 
need to be addressed beforehand. In the realm of 
security, a trust deficit between governments -- and 
even more so for maritime security stakeholders -- is 
apparent (Poole, 2015, pp. 156-157). This inhibits 
effective cooperation and ultimately, seamless 
intelligence sharing that is fundamental for collective 
maritime security. However, there have been steps to 
address this trust deficit through more security 
cooperation initiatives. The ‘Our Eyes’ initiative, 
proposed by Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu 
during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, 
should be a stepping stone towards further 
Indonesian involvement in building MDA. The 
initiative has been said to be limited for 
counterterrorism, however, it could serve as a starting 
framework for better maritime intelligence sharing 
within ASEAN (Reuters, 12 October 2017).  
In the end, to achieve the ambitions of the 
Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia would need to 
seriously consider not only the physical aspect of 
maritime development, but also developing maritime 
domain awareness as an essential enabler for its 
regional ambitions. The way to do so is to not only 
rely on its own capabilities, but also by engaging its 
regional neighbours. 
 
END NOTE 
1  In Indonesian strategic planning, there are three vital sea 
lanes known as National Sea Lanes I, II, and III. These are 
currently acknowledged as Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes 
in accordance with UNCLOS. For further elaboration, see 
Sebastian, Supriyanto, & Arsana, 2015  
2  This added authority distinguishes the Bakamla from its 
predecessor, the Bakorkamla (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan 
Laut), which previously only served an information-sharing 
function. Personal correspondence with Colonel Salim, 
Chief of Operation Strategic and Tactic, Naval Operation 
and Training Service, TNI-AL, 12 December 2017. 
3  Personal correspondence with Colonel Salim, 12 
December 2017. 
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